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CASENOTES
STOLESON V. UNITED STATES*: FTCAEXPANDING THE DISCOVERY RULE IN
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
CASES
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) , a suit could not be filed against the federal government for injury to a person or damage to property caused by a
government employee. 2 Formerly, relief for such injuries was a
* 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
1. There are several pertinent statutes involved in the present case. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1966) gives federal courts:
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
This section establishes the right of an individual to file a tort claim against
the United States in a federal district court. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v.
United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D.N.J. 1954).
State law determines whether a cause of action is stated in order to file
a tort claim since the United States is liable to the plaintiff "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Bizer v.
United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Foote v. Public Hous.
Comm'r of the United States, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1966) provides in part that "[t]he United States shall
be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." The United States, in waiving its sovereign immunity, is
to be held liable in the same manner as a private individual in like circumstances. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957); United
States v. Gregory 300 F.2d 11, 12 (10th Cir. 1962). See 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 66.03 (1980). The Act sought "to set a uniform standard for persons injured by the conduct of those acting in an official capacity. And that standard was to be the same standard as determined the
liability of anyone else." The courts, however, have not felt bound to construe this language narrowly. The United States would be liable in essentially the same manner as a private individual so long as the liability did not
generate suits not previously actionable. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950). Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (claim not given
jurisdiction since it was based on the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function or duty).
2. Before the enactment of the FTCA, a plaintiff could only obtain relief by the introduction of a private bill in Congress. The bills became too
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matter of Congressional grace. Presently under the FTCA, the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity from liability
for the torts of government employees, agents, and members of
the armed forces. 3 This Act has thereby afforded a remedy of
right not previously available to an injured party.
The FTCA, however, is governed by a two-year statute of
limitations.4 This statute encourages a plaintiff to file his lawsuit promptly and protects the defendant from the unjust burden of defending a "stale" claim.5 Thus, while the FTCA
numerous and imposed a substantial hinderance to Congress. 8 AM. Jun.
TRLALS Federal Tort Claims Act Proceedings § 3 (1965). Congress was unable to review most of these private prayers for relief and the litigants continued to be compensated for their damages as a matter of legislative grace,
not as a matter of right. See Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. United
States, 72 F. Supp. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
The definitions pertinent to the statutes involved are found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1966). A "federal agency" includes corporations primarily acting as
instrumentalities or agencies of the government, but excludes any independent contractor. An "employee of the government" includes any officers or employees of any federal agency, or persons acting on behalf of a
federal agency within the scope of employment. See Fentress v. United
States, 431 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1970) (action by government contractor's employee with resulting negligence); United States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319 (9th
Cir. 1967) (private pilot hired by Forest Service for federal service).
3. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was derived from the English
political theory that "the Crown [was] immune from any suit to which it
[had] not consented." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). The
United States, as a sovereign, was therefore immune from suit unless Congress expressly consented to be sued. That consent provided a judicial
remedy for the injured plaintiff and defined the court's jurisdiction. United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
Under the FTCA, however, the United States only partially waived its
sovereign immunity for tort claims. Congress reserved several exceptions
to liability for which an individual would normally be accountable. 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (1966). This helps clarify the subtle distinction that the government may be held liable essentially like a private individual, but with
reservations. See note 1 supra.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1966), the relevant statute of limitations, states:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six
months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
This section further provides that federal, not state, law controls the time
when a claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. Reilly v.
United States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975); Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d
933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964); Hammond v. United States,
388 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Contra, Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d
305, 309 (lst Cir. 1959) (a "claim accrued" when a private person similarly
situated would become liable under the law of the state).
For a general explanation of the difficulties experienced by the courts
in differentiating between "whether" a claim has accrued and "When" a
claim has accrued, see 35 AM. JuR. 2d FederalTort Claims Act § 126 (1967).
5. A "stale" claim is one that is not brought within the statutory period.
The legislature will not allow a plaintiff to recover if he has allowed his
claim to "slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
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provides an adequate remedy at law for the injured plaintiff, its
statute of limitations simultaneously protects the legal rights of
the defendant.
As a general rule, the statute of limitations begins to run
when a cause of action accrues. An accident or medical malpractice action usually accrues at the time of injury. 6 The fact
and existence of the injury normally provides sufficient notice of
the cause of the injury. 7 This alerts the claimant that his legal
rights have been invaded.
In litigation, however, situations often arise which prohibit
the claimant from asserting his legal rights. His injury may originate from an occupational disease 8 rather than the more commonly litigated accident 9 or patent medical malpractice action. 10
witnesses have disappeared.... The right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Railroad Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). The primary consideration of
the statute of limitations was one of fairness to the defendant. Note, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950).
6. Where the injury coincides with the act and some damage is discernible at the time, the statute of limitations begins to run immediately.
See, e.g., Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965) (fall on hospital
floor with resultant injuries); United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1978) (patient X-rayed for chest and backpains, doctor failed to tell patient
that X-rays showed tuberculosis).
7. The existence and cause of the injury are ascertainable at the time
of the negligence. See, e.g., Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.
1979) (worker electrocuted while installing lights on inactive runway);
Bizer v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (government doctor
negligently punctured plaintiff's bladder during operation); Foote v. Public
Hous. Comm'r of United States, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952) (explosion of coal stove in housing project). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 899, Comment c (1977).
8. Occupational diseases are health impairments arising from conditions of employment. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. REV. 916, 916 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Occupational
Disease]. Proof of the injury may be extraordinarily difficult. The onset of
the illness can occur many years after employment has begun, and in many
cases after employment has ended. The cause of the injury may be uncertain or the proof incomplete. Many workers and their doctors may fail to
recognize a causal connection between the injury and employment. Id. at
922. Occupational diseases usually result from harmful exposure to working conditions in a peculiar or increased degree by comparison with employment generally. lB A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 41.00

(1979) [hereinafter cited as

LARSON].

See also WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

§ 9.2 (Ill. Inst. for CLE 1979) (definition and explanation of occupational disease in Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act in Illinois).
9. An accident may be further defined as an "unlooked for mishap or
an untoward event which is not expected or designed." LARSON, supra note
8, at § 37.00. Accidents are dramatic and time-definite occurrences which
form a clear and immediate relationship between the injury and the workrelated event. OccupationalDisease, supra note 8, at 921.
10. Medical malpractice is a personal injury resulting from the misconduct of physicians, surgeons, and others practicing a similar profession
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Additionally, numerous medical malpractice situations do not
conform to the general rule. For example, the existence or
cause of the injury may not be readily apparent.1 1 In these
cases, the statute of limitations cannot be employed in its general sense. 12 Thus, a more liberal interpretation was developed.
3
This interpretation, commonly entitled the discovery rule,'
is justified for several reasons. First, the injury or consequence
of the malpractice often goes undiscovered long after the negligent act occurs.1 4 Second, even if the injury is patent, the causal
connection between the negligence and the resulting injury may
be difficult to ascertain.' 5 Third, a plaintiff, untutored in
medicine, may not discover the negligence until long after the
(dentists, psychiatrists, chiropractors, pharmacists, and x-ray technicians).

Lillich, The MalpracticeStatute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 339, 339-40 (1962). In a patent medical malpractice action, the cause and injury are discernible at or relatively near the
time of the negligent act. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W.
12 (1905) (doctor operated on the wrong ear).
11. E.g., Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973) (hearing loss
apparent, but cause not traced to negligent act until many years later);
United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958) (injury manifested itself
well after first x-ray examination). See also Comment, OccupationalCarcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitations;Resolving Relevant Policy Goals, 10

L. 113 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Occupational Carcinogenesis]
(carcinogens in occupational diseases prolong latency period before discovery of injury and produce difficulty in discovering causation).
12. Under the general rule, the statute of limitations would produce severe inequities within the legal system. A plaintiff would be forced to fie
suit without knowledge of an injury or a supportable causal relation.
13. There is no concrete definition of the "discovery rule." The
Supreme Court conceptualized the theory of the discovery rule in Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), as an expansion of the general application of
the statute of limitations. The rule permits a plaintiff to discover the existence and cause of his injury by a reasonable diligence standard. The rule
was formally acknowledged in a medical malpractice context in Quinton v.
United States, 304 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1962). Other circuits soon followed
in agreement. See Sanders v. United States, 551 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1976); Reilly v. United
States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975); Jordan v. United States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th
Cir. 1974); Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973); Tyminski v.
United States, 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973; Hungerford v. United States, 307
F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962), overruled on subsidiary issue, United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. E.g., Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff
did not learn of improper blood transfusion until her pregnancy three years
later). Cf. Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1975),
affid, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (though injury did not manifest itself for
over two years, plaintiff was not reasonably diligent thereafter in prompt
filing of claim).
15. In some cases, causation may be difficult to prove because the defendant has control of or has omitted vital information in medical records.
E.g., Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure of doctor to
transcribe culture and sensitivity test in medical record).
ENVT'L
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services were rendered by the physician. 16 These same factors
are often found in occupational disease cases.17
Prior to Stoleson v. United States, 18 the Seventh Circuit had
not decided whether the discovery rule could be applied to occupational disease cases. In Stoleson, Mrs. Stoleson ified an action
for injuries resulting from constant nitroglycerin exposure.
Though her injury was almost immediately apparent, 19 no medically recognized causal relation then existed. 20 Mrs. Stoleson
ified suit long after her first demonstrable injury and after the
statute of limitations, under the general rule, had run.21 The
precise issue facing the court was, therefore, whether the discovery rule could be applied to occupational disease cases
where no recognized causal connection existed coincident to the
time of the manifestation of the injury.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From the onset of Mrs. Stoleson's employment in early 1967
at the Badger Army Ammunition Plant (BAAP), 22 she was continuously exposed to nitroglycerin. 23 Within one year she began
16. See, e.g., Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977) (doctors stated post-operative pain was due to either a slower healing rate or
emotional problems, when pain was in fact due to blocked femoral vein);
Jordan v. United States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974) (at time of negligent
nose operation, doctor told plaintiff eye injury was a necessary consequence of surgery).
17. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (injury of silicosis

latent for many years); Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1937)

(same situation); Kuhne v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1967)
(no causal relation for radiation exposure); Williams v. Julius Klein, Inc., 38

A.D.2d 140, 327 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1972) (no causal relation of blood disease to
occupational exposure to benzene).

18. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
19. Mrs. Stoleson started work in early 1967 and was experiencing angi-

nal pains by the end of that year. See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
20. The causal relation was medically established in 1971, approximately three years after her injury. See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
21. Under the general application of the rule, Mrs. Stoleson would be

barred from bringing suit two years after February 5, 1968, the first demonstrable date of her injury. She filed suit more than four years later, on August 16, 1972.
22. The Olin Corporation operated BAAP at Baraboo, Wisconsin, on a

cost-plus fixed fee contract in conjunction with the government. The district court found that since the government was the owner of all structures,
materials, and equipment associated with the plant, it had pervasive influ-

ence and authority over BAAP. This control categorized BAAP as a "federal agency" under 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1966). Both parties conceded, as did
the 7th Circuit, that BAAP was for all practical purposes a governmental
entity. Brief for Appellant at 1, Brief for Appellee at 2-3, Stoleson v. United

States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).

23. Mrs. Stoleson was hired as a roll house operator in the rocket division. Her job entailed the continuous handling and processing of munitions
and rocket propellants containing nitroglycerin. The nitroglycerin was in
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experiencing anginal type chest pains on weekends. 2 4 On February 5, 1968, Mrs. Stoleson suffered a heart attack.25 She returned to work on May 1, 1968, after several weeks of
hospitalization. Although the hospital's physician informed her
that exposure to nitroglycerin was not the cause of her illness,
she requested a transfer to an area free from nitroglycerin.
BAAP refused her request, relying on the company physician's
opinion that nitroglycerin exposure would actually be beneficial
to Mrs. Stoleson. 26 Following her return to work, she2 7 suffered
progressively worse anginal attacks on the weekends.
After her heart attack in 1968, Mrs. Stoleson suspected a
connection between her cardiac ailment and her exposure to nitroglycerin. Subsequently, several other sources offered support of her suspicion, 28 but none proffered the medical proof
dust or powder form. The principal mode of entrance into the body was
through the skin. Stoleson v. United States, No. 74-C-297 at 9 (W.D. Wis.
Oct. 18, 1979).
Nitroglycerin is essentially a vasodilating compound. Ingestion causes
the blood vessels to dilate; withdrawal produces a vasoconstricting effect.
Withdrawal after chronic exposure produces a persistent vasoconstricting
effect which may result in angina, myocardial infarctions and ischemic episodes. See R. BERKOw, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY
478-79 (13th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MERCK].
Expert testimony established at trial that very little nitroglycerin is
necessary to produce these effects. Since nitroglycerin is fat soluble, it is
absorbed easily through the skin and the amount ingested is very difficult
or impossible to measure. The plaintiff ingested undetermined amounts of
nitroglycerin.
24. Angina, in this case angina pectoris, produces a pressure, or strangling sensation, which is relieved by rest or sublingual nitroglycerin.
MERCK, supra note 23, at 478.
25. Her condition was diagnosed as a myocardial infarction caused by a
vascular spasm. Myocardial infarction is characterized by precordial pain
similar to, but more intense than angina pectoris. This causes moderate to
severe cardiac damage (heart attack). Id. at 484. The vascular spasm is the
fibrillation or fluttering of the heart which leads to acute myocardial infarction. Id. at 449.
26. The benefit of nitroglycerin was probably the vasodilating relief
from angina attacks. This relieved the strangling sensation due to the onset
of an angina attack.
27. At the time of her termination, the attacks were occurring 4-5 times
per weekend.
28. In Spring, 1969, Mrs. Stoleson read in a union newspaper that sudden withdrawal from nitroglycerin may cause anginal chest pains. In Fall,
1969, a Wisconsin occupational safety inspector, George Coolidge, told Mrs.
Stoleson that he believed her heart problems were caused by exposure to
nitroglycerin. He cautioned her, however, that he was unaware of any supportive medical evidence.
Though Mr. Coolidge remarked that he had "proof" of the causal relation, he qualified his statement by requiring the need for medical confirmation. Mr. Coolidge was neither a medical school nor college graduate. His
proof consisted of a series of case histories on nitroglycerin exposures. Interestingly, these same case histories formed the empirical basis of Dr.
Lange's treatise, which substantiated the causal connection. Brief for Ap-
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necessary to substantiate a causal connection.29 It was not until
April, 1971, that Mrs. Stoleson obtained this concrete medical
correlation. Dr. R. L. Lange, chief of cardiology at the Medical
College of Wisconsin, examined her and concluded that her cardiovascular problems were related to nitroglycerin exposure.
Based upon Mrs. Stoleson's case and eight other BAAP case histories, Dr. Lange published the first article establishing a causal
connection between anginal problems and chronic exposure to
nitroglycerin. 30 Despite Dr. Lange's diagnosis, the BAAP physician still maintained that nitroglycerin was not causally connected to Mrs. Stoleson's ailment. 31 Rather than transfer Mrs.
Stoleson to a nitroglycerin-free area of the plant as she had prepellant at 11, Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980). See
note 30 and accompanying text infra.
The zealousness of Mr. Coolidge was probably precipitated by the government's refusal to recognize Mr. Coolidge's jurisdiction over BAAP. Mr.
Coolidge could only render advisory opinions. The workers had to rely
solely on "the government's own safety program or lack thereof." Brief for
Appellant at 11 n.3, Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
Shortly after Mrs. Stoleson spoke with Mr. Coolidge, she sought the
opinion of one of her personal physicians who confirmed that no causal relation existed. BAAP continually assured Mrs. Stoleson that there was no
basis for her causal suspicion. This opinion contradicted Mr. Coolidge's
tentative proof.
29. The Stoleson court failed to clarify which "cause" it relied on-medical or legal. Though the court spoke of medically recognized causal proof, it
was actually using the legal definition of causation. The difficulty in failing
to differentiate between these two definitions occurs when a physician is
reluctant to testify outright that an event was the cause of the resulting injury, preferring to testify instead that the event might have caused the injury. The legal definition, however, did not demand that the act be the sole
cause of the injury, but that the act was in fact a cause. See Bender v.
Dingwerth, 425 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1970). The jury, not the medical witnesses,
decides the legal question of causation. The jury need not exclude all other
causes in order to return a verdict affirming causation. The focal point of
the issue "is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion
drawn by the jury." Sentilles v. Inter-Carribean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S.
107, 110 (1959); accord, Jones v. Landry, 387 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1967)
(Supreme Court made it clear that the legal determination of the issue of
causation is not to be made by the physicians but by the jury). See generally Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the
Concept of Causation,31 TEX. L. REV. 630 (1953).
30. This article established the first medical recognition of the causal
relation in question. Neither medical journals nor clinical cardiology texts
previously discussed the problem of angina among workers constantly exposed to nitroglycerin. Dr. Lange and his co-authors considered their publication to be a medical breakthrough on this facet of nitroglycerin exposure.
Surprisingly, the basis of the article was derived from the cases which encompassed Mr. Coolidge's tentative "proof."
31. The BAAP doctor mischaracterized Dr. Lange's opinion and maintained that there existed no causal relation. Interestingly, one of Mrs.
Stoleson's physicians, who previously stated that no causal relation existed,
changed his opinion after he was confronted with Dr. Lange's proof. Brief
for Appellant at 13, Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
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viously requested, the BAAP physician recommended that Mrs.
Stoleson be discharged as unfit to work.
Following her 1971 discharge, Mrs. Stoleson filed an administrative claim on August 16, 1972.32 After an unsuccessful venture through the administrative process, she brought suit under
the FTCA in federal district court. 33 She alleged that as a result
of the Government's negligence in operating and maintaining
BAAP, she ingested nitroglycerin which caused her heart
problems. Upon the close of her case, the district court granted
the Government's motion for involuntary dismissal. 34 The district court ruled that Mrs. Stoleson's claim was properly dismissed bedause the two-year statute of limitations barred her
recovery for injuries before August 15, 1970. 3 5 Additionally, the
court held that Mrs. Stoleson did not prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Government's negligence proximately
caused any new injuries after August 15, 1970.36 Mrs. Stoleson
appealed the district court ruling. By stipulation of the parties,
the appeal was limited to the statute of limitations and the cau37
sation issues.
32. The filing of this claim effectively tolled the statute of limitations.
629 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1980).
33. Mrs. Stoleson first had to ifie with the appropriate federal agency
before she could bring suit under the FTCA. The purpose of this procedure
was to settle promptly any meritorious claim without expensive and time
consuming litigation. This would relieve unnecessary congestion in the

courts. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2517-18.
34. The district court granted the dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P.
41(b), which states in relevant part:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury,
has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not
granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts

and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
35. The court reasoned that if the discovery rule was not applicable,
Mrs. Stoleson's claim accrued on her hospitalization for a myocardial infarcation on February 5, 1968, the first date of her demonstrable injury. Alternatively, if the discovery rule was applicable, her claim accrued in
November 1969, when she read the union newspaper article and spoke with
George Coolidge. The court concluded that since both these dates were
prior to August 15, 1970, her claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
36. Stoleson v. United States, No. 74-C-297, at 22 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 18,
1979).

37. The parties stipulated that only the issues of limitations and causation be addressed. Brief for Appellant at ix-x, Brief for Appellee at 17,
Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980). Other issues that
may be raised on remand include actionable tort duty, breach of duty, the
'discretionary function' exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1966), and dam-
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THE STOLESON DECISION

Applicability of the Discovery Rule
On appeal, the Stoleson court noted that while state law determines liability, 38 federal law determines when a claim ac-

crues. 39 The court also acknowledged the statute of limitations
general rule of accrual: 4° the statute begins to run at the time of
injury. The court emphasized that this general rule, however, is
often inapplicable to medical malpractice claims. In many
cases, a plaintiff may not discover the existence or cause of his
injury for many years.4 1 The Stoleson court held that by properly applying the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until after the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should discover his injury and its
cause. 42 The Stoleson court further concluded that the discovery rule may be applied to areas other than medical malprac43
tice.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on Urie v. Thompson ,44 an occupational disease case which first proffered the theages. Reply Brief for plaintiff at 1, Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir. 1980).
The Appellate Court stated that, because of their resolution of the statute of limitations issue, it need not reach the issue of causation. Stoleson v.
United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980).
38. See, e.g., Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1979) (liability under FTCA determined "in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred").
39. See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1975)
(when a claim "accrues" is a matter of federal law); Portis v. United States,
483 F.2d 670, 672 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973) (well settled that federal law determines
when a claim accrues). But see Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305, 309
(1st Cir. 1959) (a "claim accrues" when a private person similarly situated
would become suable under the law of the state). See generally Annot., 7
A.L.R.3d 732 (1966).
40. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations does not commence until the
tort is complete, when there is "an invasion of a legally protected interest of
the plaintiff." In negligence, the cause of action is complete "When the
harm occurs." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, Comment c (1977).
See Zeidler v. United States, 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979).
41. Following medical treatment, a patient often has little or no reason
to believe that his legal rights have been invaded. See Waits v. United
States, 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980) (patient did not realize his cause of action
until hospital released his records).
42. 629 F.2d at 1269.
43. The court implied that the discovery rule should be adopted into an
occupational disease context for purposes of the present decision. The
Stoleson court cited Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1979), but
distinguished the case for no clear reason. Perhaps the Stoleson opinion
wanted to introduce the situations excepted from the general rule of accrual, yet only referred to these factors in a footnote. See notes 14-16 and
accompanying text supra.
44. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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ory of the discovery rule. 45 The Stoleson court concluded that

there was no reason to ameliorate the harsh consequences of
the statute of limitations in one area while excluding others.
Rather, any plaintiff who is blamelessly ignorant of the existence or cause of his injury should
be accorded the benefits of a
46
more liberal discovery rule.

Accrual of Stoleson 's Claim
The court noted that the discovery rule had been greatly expanded since Urie to encompass all the elements of a cause of
action.4 7 This extension, however, was short-lived. The court
45. In Urie, a railroad fireman sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) contending that he had contracted silicosis due to breathing silica dust for almost thirty years. The defendant argued that since Urie
had been exposed to this dust for many years, he must have unknowingly
contracted silicosis long before filing suit, thus filing outside the statute of
limitations.
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, preferring instead what has
been generally recognized as the precursor of the discovery rule:
If Urie were held barred from prosecuting this action because he
must be said, as a matter of law to have contracted silicosis Imore than
three years prior to filing suit], it would be clear that the federal legislation afforded Urie only a delusive remedy. It would mean that at some
past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs; under this view Urie's failure to diagnose within
the applicable statute of limitations a disease whose symptoms had not
yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute waiver of his right
to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability. **** We

do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences
to attach to blameless ignorance.
The Stoleson court reasoned that applicability of the discovery rule, as
expressed in Urie, is not governed by the occupation of the defendant, but
by the nature of the plaintiff's problems in discovering his injury and its
cause. The rule in Urie was not created in a medical malpractice sense and
is not limited to those cases. The Stoleson court followed Urie in holding
that a plaintiff's claim does not accrue until after he discovers the existence,
and consequently, the cause of his ailment.
46. Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d at 1269.
47. Several courts have held that a plaintiff's medical claim does not ac-

crue until he has had a reasonable opportunity to discover all the elements
of a possible cause of action: duty, breach, causation, and damages. They
believed that the rule must be flexibly construed to promote the sound policy that "blameless ignorance" should not result in the loss of the right to
assert a malpractice claim. See DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 279

(7th Cir. 1979), affld on rehearing, 618 F.2d 114 (1980) (court restated the
limitations rule to encompass both a subjective and an objective test-that
the statute of limitations does not run until the claimant has discovered, or
has had a reasonable opportunity to discover, all the essential elements of a
possible cause of action); Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418, 421 (10th
Cir. 1977) (claim does not accrue where patient was given a "credible explanation" of his condition); Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th
Cir. 1977) (patient not barred from bringing claim even though he experienced nominal injury at the time of operation; severe injury occurred much
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cited with approval United States v. Kubrick,48 which held that a
claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should discover the critical facts of the
49
existence and cause of his injury.
The Government in Stoleson contended that under the
Kubrick standard Mrs. Stoleson's suspicions formed sufficient
knowledge to commence the statute of limitations. The Stoleson
court rejected this argument and held that a layman's subjective
belief is inadequate to constitute medical proof of cause and
existence. The court concluded that not until Mrs. Stoleson consulted Dr. Lange did her suspicions form concrete knowledge of
the missing element--causation. 50 Mrs. Stoleson diligently filed
her claim within two years of Dr. Lange's publication.5 1 Accordingly, the Stoleson court reversed the involuntary dismissal entered by the district court and remanded for trial on the merits.
ALTERNATIVE INROADS FOR STOLESON

The Stoleson court could have relied on three different theories to support its conclusion. First, Stoleson might have been
decided as a direct extension of the rule of law expressed in
Urie. Second, Stoleson could have been resolved through analogies to the discovery rule in the medical malpractice field. Finally, Stoleson might have been adjudicated by holding that the
Government was estopped from raising the statute of limitations because of its assertion of inconsistent causal theories.
later); Jordan v. United States, 503 F.2d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1974) (although
injury apparent, no reason to suspect malpractice).

48. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
49. The accrual of a medical malpractice claim need not await the discovery of all the elements in a cause of action: duty, breach, causation, and
damages. Kubrick explained that a plaintiff, with knowledge of his injury
and its cause, is no longer dependent on the defendant's professional exper-

tise. The plaintiff can now seek other professional advice to decide whether

to bring suit. Id. at 122.
50. Despite or perhaps because of her diligence, this was the first point
at which Mrs. Stoleson could have pursued her claim against the United
States. Therefore, under Kubrick, this was the moment when the statute of

limitations commenced. Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d at 1270-71.
Stoleson noted a factual distinction between the present facts and
Kubrick. The Court in Kubrick noted that had Kubrick sought timely advice, he would have uncovered the physician's negligence. Since medical
science acknowledged Kubrick's treatment as inadequate, Kubrick was not
blameless for his ignorance and delay. This factual distinction does not detract from Mrs. Stoleson's allegations, but rather lends support for the law
expounded in Kubrick.
51. The Stoleson decision does not make clear whether the date of consultation or the date of publication was used in commencing the statute of
limitations. In some cases, a substantial disparity in time between consultation and publication may cause the courts much confusion. In either case,
Mrs. Stoleson filed within the prescribed two-year limit.
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Any of these methods would have achieved the desired result:
procuring justice by preserving of Mrs. Stoleson's personal
rights. The court, however, chose only to address the medical
malpractice theory in a vague and unconvincing attempt to substantiate its ruling.
An Extension of URIE
The Stoleson court failed to recognize that this case might
have been decided solely on the rationale of Urie and its nonmedical malpractice progeny. 52 In Urie, the plaintiff filed suit
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)5 3 for silico-

sis injury contracted through exposure to silica at work.5 4 The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that Urie's
claim was untimely because of the long exposure to silica.5 5 The
Court reasoned that:
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such
consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think
those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the
assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of
the invasion of legal rights ....

[C]onsequently the afflicted em-

efployee can be held to be "injured" only when the accumulated
56
fects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves.
Urie noted that the language of the FELA was liberally written
to encompass the humanitarian purposes for which it was intended.5 7 The humane legislative intent of the FELA is strik52. Hammond v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (negli-

gent issuance of unsafe oral polio vaccine); Kuhne v. United States, 267 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (occupational disease-radiation exposure);

Foote v. Public Hous. Comm'r of the United States, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.
Mich. 1952) (accident--coal stove explosion).

53. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1977). Section 51 imposed liability on a railroad
for anyone injured while employed by the railroad due to the negligence of
the railroad or its agents or employees. Rights under the FELA are governed by federal law to guarantee homogeneity. Suits must be fied within
Inst. for
three years of the injury. ART OF DISCOVERY, F.E.L.A. §§ 4.2-4.3 (Ill.
CLE 1975). For a brief discussion of when a claim accrues under FELA, see
11 AM. JuR. TiALis FELA Litigation §§ 65-66 (1965).
54. Silicosis is a disabling lung ailment caused by inhaling dust containing silicon dioxide. The silicon dioxide eventually incapacitates the lungs
from supplying oxygen to the blood. OccupationalDisease,supra note 8, at
924. For a technical discussion of silicosis, see MERCK, supra note 23, at 62325.
55. If Urie's cause of action was subjected to the general application of
the discovery rule, it would have run at some undiscernible time when the
injury inconspicuously manifested itself within Urie's lungs. This would be
outside the scope of the three year limitations. Thus, denial of any similar
cause of action where the injury could not be discovered before the statute
ran would be grossly inequitable and unjust.
56. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
57. Urie noted the broad language in the FELA, providing that "any
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ingly similar to the FTCA. Both acts serve to expand the rights
of the individual against the tortious actions of the government. 58 An issue arises, however, whether "accrual" as used in
both acts is to be defined similarly for purposes of their statutes
of limitations.5 9
A resolution of this issue was enunciated in Foote v. Public
Housing Commissionerof the United States.6 0 Foote, an occupational accident case,6 1 held that when Congress used substantially the same wording in the FELA and the FTCA, the
legislative purpose was to construe the word "accrues" in the
same manner. This conclusively demonstrated the similar legislative intent necessary for an integrated analysis of both Acts.
The Stoleson court failed to use this integration to resolve
the conflict. Urie established a more liberal limitations rule to
safeguard those plaintiffs who could not, with reasonable diliperson suffering injury while he is employed", and "such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence" of any officer or em-

ployee, apparently made every injury suffered by any employee in the
course of employment due to some negligence compensable. Id. at 181.
58. Similar to the railroad in the FELA, the Government in the FTCA is
responsible for its negligence to an employee while engaged in work. Compare 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939) with 28 U.S.C.§ 1346(b) (1966). See also Shimp v.
New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976) (employee
has common law right to safe working environment-issuance of smoking
injunction); Employment-Employee's Right to a Safe, Healthy Work Environment-Injunction Issued Prohibiting Tobacco Smoking in Offices and
Customer Service Area on Employer's Premises, 8 CUM. L. REV. 579 (1977);
Torts-OccupationalSafety and Health-Employee's Common Law Right to
a Safe Workplace Compels Employer to Eliminate Unsafe Conditions, 30

L. REV. 1074 (1977).
59. FELA: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless

VAND.

commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued."

45 U.S.C. § 56 (1939).
FTCA: "A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within

two years after such claim accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1966).
Although the accrual clauses in both acts are substantially similar,

one's wording is not a mirror image of the other. This raises the possibility
of arguing differing interpretations of the clauses. If there is a difference,

however, it would not aid the government for a "claim" would be at least as
broad, if not broader, than the legalistic formula "cause of action". United
States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 679, 693 (5th Cir. 1958).
60. 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
61. American courts define "accident" as an unexpected event which is
"traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite time, place and occasion or
cause." Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensationfor Industrial
Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CAUF. L.REv. 531, 543 (1954). Occupational
diseases, however, are impairments of health resulting from conditions of
employment. They may be extraordinarily difficult for the victim to prove.
The onset of the illness can occur long after employment has begun, and
even after it has terminated. See Comment, JudicialAttitudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 344
(1977). Although this discussion is outside the scope of this article, the author feels it is necessary in differentiating for future applications.
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gence, discover the cause or existence of the injury. Mrs.
Stoleson sought the advice of several physicians and yet no
causal relation was ascertained.6 2 The Urie Court certainly
would not have charged Mrs. Stoleson with the knowledge of the
cause of her injury prior to any supporting medical proof. Only
when the cause is medically recognized will Urie allow the stat63
ute of limitations to run against an injured plaintiff.
Kuhne v. United States,64 an occupational disease case,
demonstrates when Urie permits the statute of limitations to
commence in regard to a previously unverifiable cause. In
Kuhne, the plaintiff alleged that exposure to radioactive materials during the course of his employment caused his disease. Fifteen years elapsed before the injury surfaced. Mr. Kuhne
consulted a physician who initially stated that his disease was
not causally related to radiation exposure. Two years later that
physician reversed his opinion when an article was published
which supported the causal connection. 65 The Kuhne court
noted that under Urie, a claim does not accrue until the existence or cause of the injury is discovered or, by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have been discovered. Thus, Kuhne
medical evicould only have brought an action once supporting
66
dence was or should have been obtained.
Similar to Mr. Kuhne, Mrs. Stoleson alleged that her exposure to a deleterious substance caused her illness. Both Kuhne
and Stoleson consulted physicians who informed them of no
medically known causal relationship. After medical proof was
established, both physicians reversed their diagnoses and con67
firmed the causal correlation.
Kuhne factually supports the direct application of Urie to
Stoleson. Since Kuhne adhered to Urie's standard of reason62. While Mrs. Stoleson's problem involved causation, Mr. Urie's dilemma encompassed the manifestation of his injury. This factual distinction, however, bears no weight in the holding. Urie implied that the
absence of either cause or existence may generate use of the more liberal
statute of limitations.
63. Mrs. Stoleson's claim accrued when she learned of medical support
to substantiate her allegations. Urie's cause of action accrued when his illness emerged from its latency.
64. 267 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
65. The facts of Kuhne were strikingly similar to Stoleson. Here, as in

Kuhne, after medical proof surfaced, the competent physician reconsidered
his opinion and reversed his previous diagnosis. See note 33 supra.
66. 267 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
67. These reversals in no way imply any hint of malpractice. At the
time of the original diagnosis, there existed no generally recognized causal
standard in the community. Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 12324 (1979) (if community recognizes a generally applicable standard of care,
competent advice would be readily available to plaintiff).
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able diligence in discovering the existence or cause of an injury,
and Stoleson is factually similar to Kuhne, the Stoleson court
should have found Urie controlling. A plaintiff who diligently
endeavors to discover the cause of his injury should be properly
awarded the benefit of a more liberal and just discovery rule.
Analogies to the Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice
Alternatively, the Stoleson court attempted to decide the
case through medical malpractice analogies. Though the discovery rule did not evolve from medical malpractice decisions, 68 its
adoption in that area was unchallenged. 69 The Stoleson court
70
briefly mentioned two major reasons for this application.
First, the injury or consequence of the malpractice might often
remain undiscovered for many years. Second, courts have recognized that even where an injury was apparent, the causal connection between the doctor's acts and the injury may be difficult
to ascertain.7 1 The Stoleson court concluded that, when applying either of these exceptions, the statute of limitations should
begin to run only when the plaintiff discovered or, in the exerthe critical
cise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered
72
facts of his injury: its existence and cause.
The Stoleson court failed to expressly state why the facts
clearly conform to this second exception to the general rule.
Mrs. Stoleson could not obtain sufficient causal proof since there
was no medically recognized relation at the time of her injury.
Without adequate evidence verifying a causal connection, her
73
negligence suit would lack an essential element--causation.
68. See Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1962) (the
court expressly stated that its decision was supported by the ruling in

Urie). But see Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Interp7 etation of Two
Year Period of Limitations, 34 TENN. L. REv. 421, 430 (1967) (implies the

discovery rule originated in medical malpractice cases through Quinton but
not Urie).
69. See note 13 supra.
70. The Stoleson court did not hold that a plaintiff, unschooled in
medicine, may reasonably await all the elements for his cause of action.
This directly follows from the curtailment set forth in Kubrick. See note 49
supra.

71. E.g., Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1973) (injury
soon apparent, but advice from approximately seven physicians within a

five-year period did not establish the correlation of the negligent act to the
injury); see generally Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938) (accepted rule is that negligence of physician must be established by expert
medical testimony, unless so grossly apparent that a normal person would
have no difficulty in recognizing it).
72. 629 F.2d at 1269.
73. Mrs. Stoleson only needed the testimony of one doctor to support
her suspicions. She need not establish that the nitroglycerin exposure was
the cause, just a cause of her injury. See note 29 supra.
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Although Mrs. Stoleson's suspicions were well-founded, hindsight does not transform mere speculation into hard-core fact.
Congress, in the FTCA, did not intend the filing of a negligence
claim prior to the establishment of its critical elements-existence and cause.
Although Mrs. Stoleson's occupational disease case fits the
medical malpractice exception, the problem of bridging these
two differing areas of law remains. The Stoleson court only
vaguely alluded to this obstacle by acknowledging Urie as the
precursor of the discovery rule. The court should have emphasized the ruling of Quinton v. United States,74 which established
the necessary correlation between the medical malpractice and
occupational disease fields. Quinton was the first court which
expressed the discovery rule and applied it in a medical malpractice context.75 The Quinton court reasoned that the most
sensible and just rule was to permit the statute of limitations to
begin to run only when the plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the acts
constituting the allegations. 76 Thus, Quinton demonstrated that
occupational diseases and medical malpractice injuries can be
similarly treated with respect to the statute of limitations. This
justifies the application of the reasonable diligence standard of
the discovery rule to both areas of law.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick 77 defined
the limits of the Quinton rationale 7 8 and held that the "accrual"
of a claim need not await the plaintiff's awareness. 7 9 The Court
74. 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
75. Quinton relied heavily on the rationale of Urie and Foote in rendering its decision. Other courts have followed this trend but have not expressly stated the applicability as clearly as Quinton. See, e.g., Young v.
Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961); see also Bizer v. United States,
124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
76. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1962).
77. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
78. After Quinton but before Kubrick, there was a general expansion of
the discovery rule to encompass all the elements of negligence. E.g., DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1979), a'd on rehearing,618 F.2d
114 (7th Cir. 1980) (statute of limitations only allowed to run when plaintiff
has reasonably discovered all the elements of the alleged negligence: duty,
breach, causation, damages). Kubrick restricted this outgrowth considerably by only requiring cause and existence of the injury before allowing the
statute to run. Contra, 23 TRIL LAw GuIDE 555 (1980) (refuted Kubrick in
favor of the DeWitt rationale).
79. Kubrick based this statement on Congressional intent of the FTCA.
Congress intended the FTCA to supply a remedy for those injured as a result of governmental negligence. Congress also intended that the statute of
limitations encourage prompt presentation of claims. The statute was enacted for the benefit of the government, not for the individual wronged.
Congress aimed to thwart the claims of those not reasonably diligent. The
government should not be overburdened in being obligated to defend long-
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maintained that once the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity
to discover the "critical facts" of his injury, cause and existence,
the statute of limitations would begin to run.80
The Stoleson court correctly concluded that Kubrick supported Mrs. Stoleson's claim against BAAP. Mrs. Stoleson must
have reasonably established the existence and cause of her injury before the statute of limitations would begin to run. She
knew of her injury no later than February 5, 1968, and diligently
sought to discover the cause of her heart attack. Her suspicions,
however well-founded, did not amount to that necessary to engage the statute of limitations. Only after Dr. Lange provided
her with a supportable causal relationship did the statute begin
to run. Mrs. Stoleson then had the "critical facts" necessary to
file a valid and maintainable lawsuit. Since she filed within the
time limits prescribed, the statute of limitations did not bar her
8
otherwise valid claim. '

The Estoppel Argument
Although the Stoleson opinion briefly mentioned the Government's duty to its employees, it made no mention of the possibility that the Government could have been estopped from
raising the statute of limitations as a defense.8 2 The doctrine of
equitable estoppel 83 can be argued when a plaintiff has demonstanding stale claims. 444 U.S. at 117. This imposed too great a burden in
keeping records, finding witnesses, and testifying to remote and forgotten
facts. See Railroad Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). "Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their
conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of [stale] claims.. "
80. 444 U.S. at 122. See Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir.
1980) (dealt only with ignorance of the underlying facts of cause and injury
in a hospital malpractice case).
81. On remand, it may be discovered that some other issue, e.g., causation, will invalidate Mrs. Stoleson's suit. For the purposes of the present
decision, however, Mrs. Stoleson is said to have a maintainable cause of
action.
82. Historically, governmental immunity was derived from the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U.
Cm. L. REV. 680, 683 (1954). The government's welfare superseded the rem-

edy of the injured individual. As representative of all people, the government is charged with the protection of financial stability and should not be
estopped by a plaintiff who asserts his private financial interests. Saltman,

Estoppel Against the Government: Have Recent DecisionsRounded the Corners of the Agent's Authority Problem in FederalProcurements?,45 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 500 (1976).

83. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is easily understood. It means
that one is "barred" from asserting something because basic principles of
equity and justice would otherwise be violated. Usually he is estopped from
stating the true facts or asserting his valid lawsuit due to prior inconsistent
statements or activities. REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQTurrY-RESTrrTION § 2.3

(Dobbs ed. 1973).
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strated that (1) the employer or his agent (2) misinformed the
plaintiff, and (3) thereby misled the plaintiff in respect to his
84
cause of action.
The facts of Stoleson conformed to these three elements.
First, the BAAP doctor was acting on behalf of his employer, the
United States government.85 Second, the BAAP doctor told Mrs.
Stoleson not only that nitroglycerin exposure was not causally
related to her ailment, but that the exposure was beneficial to
her health.86 This diagnosis directly contradicted the govern87
ment's earlier findings on the harmful effects of nitroglycerin.
Furthermore, although the BAAP doctor had continually stated
that there was no causal relationship, the government contended in its defense that causation existed either at the time of
her cardiac attack in 1968 or at the time of her discussion with
Mr. Coolidge in 1969.88 Finally, Mrs. Stoleson did not file her suit
84. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R., 467 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Neb. 1979). Ac-

cord,

REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQurrY-RESTrrUTION

§ 2.3 at 42 (Dobbs ed.

1973) (basic elements are: (1) actor must have knowledge of true facts and
communicate them in a misleading way; (2) the other relies upon that communication; and (3) the other would be materially harmed if actor is later
permitted to assert that inconsistency).
85. Since the United States was in control of BAAP, the doctor was the
company physician-employee of the government. See note 22 supra. The
United States waived its sovereign immunity by the FTCA, and thus can be
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in the same manner as a
private individual. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 131 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (in cases where sovereign immunity has been
waived, government can be estopped by conduct of its agents in the same
circumstances as a private individual, partnership, or corporation); Small &
Robinson, Inc., v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (Government can be bound by doctrine of equitable estoppel where (1) it has
waived its sovereign immunity, (2) its agent acted within his authority, and
(3) the estoppel claimed would give the citizen his substantive rights); see
generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. Estoppel Against Federal Government § 6
(1976).
86. The mistake of the BAAP doctor goes to the heart of equitable estoppel. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959)
(maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong is deeply rooted
in the American system of jurisprudence); R.H. Stearns Co. v. United States
291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934) ("[no] one shall be permitted to found any claim
upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.").
87. There were previous standards set forth by various agencies regarding safety and health regulations in handling nitroglycerin powder.
Stoleson v. United States, No. 74-C-297 at 2-6 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 18, 1979). The
district court found that these regulations and guidelines had not been
properly followed. Id. at 8-10.
88. Equitable estoppel would prevent the government from assuming
inconsistent positions to the detriment of Mrs. Stoleson. Estoppel is based
on public policy and good faith. It is intended to protect against injustice
and fraud. See Saltman, Estoppel Against the Government: Have Recent
Decisions Rounded the Cornersof the Agent's Authority Problem in Federal
Procurements?,45 FORDHAm L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1976). The inconsistency
or misinformation need not be intentional, so long as the employee relies on
it in good faith. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231
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earlier since she had no reason to doubt the competent diagno89
sis of the BAAP doctor.
The Government should have been barred from asserting
the statute of limitations as a defense because of its prior inconsistent statements. 90 It would have been inequitable for the
Government to argue causation when its own doctor professed
the contrary. Therefore, Mrs. Stoleson should have been allowed to sue for injuries under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS OF STOLESON

The discovery rule is, in essence, a balancing factor of the
government/individual tort conflict. While justice mandates a
remedy for the injured plaintiff, it must yet attend to the rights
of the defendant United States. As Kubrick adjusts the blinders
of justice for parity in medical malpractice actions, Stoleson harmonizes the competing forces in occupational disease conflicts.
Yet Stoleson does more. It provides a pathway for the "accrual" rule of Urie and Kubrick in tort claims arising under
other statutes. 91 Additionally, the discovery rule of the FTCA
(1959) (Court employed broad language applying to all cases of estoppel
and did not limit its holding to intentional fraud); Louisville & Nashville

R.R. v. Disspain, 275 F.2d 25, 26-27 (6th Cir. 1960) (unintentional misrepresentations of doctor sufficient to toll the statute of limitations). Cf. Fletcher
v. Union Pac. R.R., 467 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Neb. 1979) (although doctor misinformed plaintiff of back injury while working for railroad, plaintiff was not
reasonably diligent after he conclusively knew of his injury). See generally
Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d Estoppel to Rely on Statute of Limitations § 19 (1952).
89. There was nothing which would have led Mrs. Stoleson to doubt the
competence of the BAAP doctor. Neither the district court opinion nor the
appellant's briefs implied incompetence. The circuit court decision even alluded to the competence of the BAAP doctor's diagnosis. Stoleson v.

United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1980).
90. The Government's claim to an immunity from the doctrine of equitable estoppel would be "a claim to exemption from the requirements of
morals and justice." Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 680, 683 (1954).
91. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, Comment c (1979)
which proposes that a similar discovery rule be applied to other professional malpractice situations.
Two major areas under scrutiny are the following:
Attorneys: See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1975)
(held that cause of action did not accrue until after plaintiff discovered or
reasonably could have discovered the legal malpractice, i.e., after judgment
of circuit court had been made final); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d
433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (claim in tort does not accrue until the client (1)
sustains some extent of injury, and (2) discovers or should discover his
cause of action). See generally Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in
California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA L. 257 (1970); Annot., 18
A.L.R. 3d Limitations-Attorney'sMalpractice 978 (1968).
Accountants: See, e.g., Cook v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 257 Cal. 2d
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may be applicable to numerous other legislative acts intended to
compensate an individual for the tortious conduct of a governmental entity. 92 Though these applications might open the floodgates to future litigation, 93 one must remember the dual
purpose of the rule. The law affords the plaintiff a just remedy
while simultaneously protecting the defendant from stale
claims. In its proper perspective, this rule will aid both the gov452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969) (title company-two successive mistakes of
acreage, claim accrued only when grantees refused to return property not
properly theirs); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (tax accountant changed methods without prior approval of Commissioner, claim
accrues when deficiency assessed by IRS). See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R.
3d Limitations-Accountant'sNegligence 1438 (1969).
92. Many other acts passed by Congress may be expanded to the justifable limits of Stoleson. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970), articulated a prevention policy of occupational
hazards but failed to provide for actions by employees to ensure a safe
working environment. Stoleson may be used as support for the satisfaction
of an individual's rights in state or federal court under the traditional notions of equity. See generally Article, Injunctions Against Occupational
Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702
(1976).
Many claims for occupational diseases are made under federal or state
workmen's compensation acts. All the states, as well as the federal government, enacted various types of occupational disease statutes. Courts have
held that the appropriate statute of limitations begins either at the time of
(a) the wrongful conduct, (b) the last injurious exposure, (c) a disability or
(d) the discovery of the occupational nature of the disease. Stoleson would
act as persuasive authority to sway courts to (d) the discovery of the cause
of one's injury. This would procure the most equitable solution against an
otherwise limiting workmen's compensation act. See generally Occupational Carcinogenesis,supra note 11, at 128-34.
In products liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury, a defective
product, and the causal relationship. The statute of limitations may sometimes bar recovery because of the traditional focus on accidental injuries.
Stoleson might lend support to a change which allows a manufacturer's liability to encompass the useful life of the product and a limited period thereafter. Courts may even extend the limitations rule to the date when the
injury first manifests itself. This extension will justify any claim of latent
carcinogenesis or other dormant disease. See generally OccupationalDisease, supra note 8, at 926-28.
93. The crushing overabundance of claims congesting the courts has not
yet materialized,, though some cases signal a possible future onslaught.
E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980). DES was given to a mother and her
daughter sued for injury. Since the daughter did not know which company
manufactured the drug, all manufacturers who contributed substantially to
the market in that area were held liable in proportion to their market share.
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 963, 1007 (1978) (in conceding the widespread consequences of industry-wide liability, commented that "Ithe DES cases are only the tip of
an iceberg"); See Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 998
(1979) ("Elimination of the burden of proof as to identification [of the manufacturer whose drug injured the plaintiff] would impose a liability which
would exceed absolute liability.").
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ernment and the individual in ameliorating the harsh consequences found in these other areas of law.
The two-year statute of limitations in the FTCA poses a severe problem in occupational disease actions. Often, the existence or cause of the injury is not readily apparent. Rather than
permit the plaintiff to assume an unjust burden in asserting his
claim, compelling equitable considerations require that the
courts modify the general rule for when the statute of limitations "accrues". In cases such as Stoleson the plaintiff now has
three alternative arguments to support the timeliness of his action. First, he may support his claim directly under Urie. Second, the plaintiff may analogize his injury to similar situations
where the discovery rule is applicable. Finally, he may argue
that the defendant is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.
These three options, however, are not limited solely to occupational disease situations. The Stoleson decision, though analytically vague, impliedly postulates a feasible solution to the
issue of collateral application of the discovery rule to other areas
of the law. This decision enables other claimants to utilize the
rule in procuring a just and sensible resolution. Stoleson enhances the trend of judicial consideration in alleviating certain
inequities of law which unforseeably arise as an unwanted consequence of legislative enactments.
John Wm. Aniol

